Therapeutic Discipline? Reflections on the Penetration of Sites of Control by Therapeutic Discourse by Jefferson, Andrew M.




Refl ections on the penetration of sites of control 
by therapeutic discourse
This article addresses the way in which therapeutic 
practice in an English prison creates conditions where-
by both prisoners and prison offi cers are caught up in 
networks and relationships of power that contribute to 
the constitution of particular subjects. The development 
of therapeutic practice, in relation to prisons and pro-
bation, is described and contextualised. Subsequently, 
the practices of group therapy in operation at Grendon 
prison – a rather unique institution built on principles 
of therapeutic community – are analysed with a focus 
on fi ve “practices of moulding,” namely, naming, 
confession, assessment and surveillance, tolerance 
and participation. The argument that psychotherapy, 
under conditions of imprisonment, is a form of repres-
sion or social control is discussed and dismissed as too 
simple a model to account for the relations of power 
and constitutive practices that effect all participants, not 
only prisoners. Members of staff, as well as prisoners, 
are shown to be caught up in the disciplinary web. 
Discipline, as opposed to control, is advocated as a 
more appropriate concept for understanding therapeutic 
practices in prison. The work of Thomas Mathiesen, 
on the concept of synoptic power, is introduced to help 
illustrate these dynamics. The article represents a shift 
in my own thinking, from scepticism to a pragmatic 
idealist position, that creates space for institutions like 
Grendon to be imagined as potential least worst options 
for people convicted of offences and obliged to serve 
“time”. It is my hope, argued for in the article, that 
Grendon can be conceived of as a “visionary space” 
with emancipatory potential.
1 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for sub-
stantive critiques of earlier versions of this paper and 
to editor Morten Nissen for stimulating remarks that 
contributed to fi ne-tuning. Responsibility for ongoing 
limitations remains my own. I dedicate this article to 
John Beebe, ex-Grendon inmate, friend, and mentor in 
prison practices.
“To give some assistance in wearing away certain self-evidences and commonplaces about 
madness, illness, crime and punishment; to bring it about, together with many others, that cer-
tain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or at least no longer 
so unhesitatingly, performed; to contribute to changing certain things in people’s ways of per-
ceiving and doing things; to participate in this diffi cult displacement of forms of sensibility and 
thresholds of tolerance – I hardly feel capable of attempting much more than that.”
(Michel Foucault 1991: 83)
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Background
Psychotherapy and imprisonment would to 
most both liberal and conservative minded 
people appear to be mutually exclusive. The 
idea of a therapeutic prison would be anath-
ema. This article draws on my own experience 
working for a short period at Grendon – a ther-
apeutic prison in the UK – and my purpose is to 
show that both the liberal and the conservative 
positions are misguided. Whilst a conservative 
critique of a therapeutic prison would focus on 
the lack of necessity for therapy for obvious 
evildoers, the liberal critique would argue that 
therapy under structured constraints and appar-
ent duress is merely a disguised form of state 
repression and therefore illegitimate2.
My original purpose with this article3 was 
in fact to articulate a liberal critique of Gren-
don prison, to show how the processes and 
practices of therapeutic communities are an 
extension of repressive social control. How-
ever, as I read McMahon’s fi ne book The Per-
sistent Prison and reread Michel Foucault’s 
work on discipline I was presented with an 
alternative lens through which to analyse my 
own experiences and refl ections on Grendon. 
To the degree that I began sceptically and 
end up advocating a more nuanced – what 
I call pragmatic idealist position – I in some 
way share common ground with Gender and 
Players, the authors of an in-depth study of 
Grendon, fi rst published in 1995 three years 
after my 6 month stint at Grendon. They write 
“We began with the view that a therapeutic 
prison was not a feasible proposition: that the 
demands of custody and treatment were anti-
thetical.” Yet, they continue, “we have been 
persuaded that a therapeutic prison is not only 
possible but desirable” (1995:17). The position 
I argue for in this article is not so much that 
therapeutic prisons are desirable, though one 
could draw that conclusion from my analysis, 
but that we must conceptualise the complexity 
of what goes on in the therapeutic prison in a 
manner that is less naive than the liberal and 
conservative critiques. The interesting issue 
for Gender and Players, (and myself) became 
not how “therapy could be used to exert con-
trol, but how such control differed from that 
enforced in other prisons and what purposes 
it served” (1995:17).
A Caveat
Gender and Players’ study is rich in empiri-
cal material and illustrative cases, a result of 
their work being based on a clearly articulated 
research strategy. My own refl ections are at 
a more general level of abstraction and at a 
greater distance from the material. This is a 
refl ection of the fact that I was not conducting 
a specifi c study of Grendon whilst I was there. 
My own refl ections are thus more experiential, 
ethnographic and in a sense post hoc. They 
are led by my analytic interest in exploring 
the relationship between care and control and 
also informed by the fact that at the time I 
worked at Grendon, I was living with an ex-
Grendon inmate.
Introduction
Issues of power, both in practice and theory, 
in relation to psychological interventions have 
been of interest to me since I was fi rst em-
ployed as a student in an English social work 
department working with so-called young 
offenders. These themes have pursued me 
throughout various jobs and various periods 
of study and remain pertinent in my current 
2 I am sympathetic to Nissen’s persuasive critique (in 
Nordiske Udkast, 2002) of the liberal position where 
he demonstrates how control is always an aspect of 
care. A similar argument can be made about psy-
chotherapy whether in prisons or elsewhere. There is 
always a normative element.
3 An earlier version was presented at the 28th Annual 
Conference of The European Group for the Study of 
Deviance and Social Control I am grateful to RCT 
and to Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi for 
fi nancial support that enabled me to participate in this 
conference.
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situation where I am connected to the research 
department of the Rehabilitation and Research 
Centre for Torture Victims (RCT).
This article focuses on the rise of the 
therapeutic in sites of control. The relation-
ship between control and care, a relationship 
that comes into particular sharp relief in sites 
of control penetrated by therapeutic discourse, 
is problematised. The intention is to open up 
the practice of therapeutic discourse to deeper 
analysis, not necessarily to condemn it or praise 
it. I will describe the way forms of power in 
some sites of control have been transformed, 
alongside a consideration of what conditions 
have allowed for these changes (e.g. the psy-
chologisation of everyday life).
Two key questions guide my analysis: Is 
therapeutic practice emancipatory (or libera-
tive – McMahon 1992). Or is therapeutic prac-
tice a form of repression, a form of increased 
social control? In other words does therapeutic 
practice in prison create more humane condi-
tions and offer opportunities that improve lives 
or does it close down opportunities and im-
pose restrictive norms on thought and action? 
Or does it do something altogether different? 
These questions are rooted in the fundamental 
question: what do therapeutic practices do to 
people?
The idea that punishment following convic-
tion for an offence is not merely a punishment 
or deterrent but also a correctional practice, a 
practice designed to produce reformed charac-
ters – to restore lost subjects – is not a new one. 
Both prisons and probation have been at differ-
ent times perceived as more or less rehabilita-
tive in their intention. Michel Foucault (1977:
123) has written, “the prison would constitute 
the “space between two worlds” the place 
for the individual transformation that would 
restore to the state the subject it had lost.” 
The fi rst world that the prison is between, is 
a lost world, a world alien, other, different to 
society, the inhabitation of which causes the 
delinquent’s expulsion. The other world is the 
found world, the world outside the prison, that 
the delinquent discovers by fi nding himself in 
the correctional space of the prison.
Whilst attempts at rehabilitation have been 
public policy on and off throughout penal his-
tory, the application of psychology to people 
convicted of offences is a relatively recent 
phenomenon – let us say a late 20th century 
phenomenon. This is of course a refl ection 
of psychology’s history and not much to do 
with the history of prisons. Only since the 
2nd World War did Therapeutic Communities 
(TC’s) emerge as an approach to the treatment 
of those traumatised by war and it took some 
time before these all-encompassing models 
(fi rst applied in a medical context) could be 
applied in a prison context. In the UK, Grendon 
Prison was fi rst opened in 1962 and has for 
many years since stood as a single, largely ig-
nored, fl agship of therapeutic community prin-
ciples applied in a carceral setting. Indeed, as 
Gender and Players put it “… for most of its 
30 years of operation Grendon has inhabited 
an ideological wilderness, out of step with the 
prevailing ethos and marginal to mainstream 
penal practice” (Gender and Players, 1995:5). 
Therapeutic discourse is a late and marginal 
development in the history of dealing with 
people convicted of offences.
Therapeutic discourse
What do I mean by the term therapeutic dis-
course and practice? I do not just mean psycho-
therapy applied to individuals or groups. Nor 
do I merely mean the psy-disciplines (cf. Rose 
1985). For me therapeutic discourse is much 
broader. Something therapeutic is something 
that brings about a change for the better in a 
person’s psyche, being or lived world. Thera-
peutic discourse is a set of practices and ways 
of talking about changing a person for the 
better, more specifi cally about correcting or 
addressing a problem or set of problems. It is 
not just bodies, or workers that are targeted; 
it is selves who are subjected to a therapeutic 
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intervention. In Foucault’s terms it is lives and 
not just acts that are to be intervened upon. 
By using the term discourse I am attempting 
to avoid limiting the scope of the therapeutic 
to direct interventions by psy-professionals. 
Therapeutic discourse includes practices, pro-
grammes, politics and knowledge. It is a way 
of talking about persons convicted of offences 
as well as a way of writing about and acting 
towards or on them.
Psychologisation
Psychologisation is a term I use for recent 
developments in western liberal democracies 
that give pride of place to certain ways of 
viewing self and society, which can be seen 
as having to do with psychology. I mean, for 
example, the increase in references to ones 
self-esteem as a way of explaining why one 
is not successful; the way personal fulfi lment 
has become a criteria for a good job; the way 
the unconscious has crept into popular dis-
course; to the other multiple ways in which 
psychological knowledge now pervades and 
informs many of the structures and institutions 
– courts, factories, schools, hospitals, prisons, 
families – which make up our societies. Psy-
chological knowledge is a generous knowledge 
and it has not restricted itself to the academy. 
It has been adopted by the people. As Rose 
(1992:351) puts it “psychological know-how 
has made itself indispensable”. This in turn 
makes possible “forms of expertise that have a 
particular capacity to graft themselves onto the 
practices of all those concerned with the con-
duct of conduct” (Rose, ibid.). Nikolas Rose 
has described variations on these themes in a 
number of places (e.g. Rose 1985, 1990, 1992, 
1996) but an earlier more radical voice can 
be found in Castel, Castel and Lovell’s social 
analysis of psychiatry in the USA (Castel et 
al, 1982). The authors describe contemporary 
social life as a psychiatric society describing 
how marginal groups are ordered and control-
led through manipulative techniques borrowed 
from psychiatric discourse. Their interpretation 
of the psychologisation of everyday life is an 
example of the repressive hypothesis that I will 
challenge later, yet their description of devel-
opments in late 20th century western societies 
is persuasive.
Therapeutic discourse 
in sites of control
Unlike Kyvsgaard (1997) who prescriptively, 
and naively in my view, concludes that treat-
ment and punishment should be always sepa-
rate (that treatment should be an opportunity 
and that it should occur under conditions of 
freedom) I take actual current practice as my 
starting point. Treatment is going on in sites 
of control4, that is, in prisons and in the com-
munity in the form of so-called community 
penalties. Prison and probation service pro-
grammes are sites of control in the sense that 
it is in them and under their jurisdiction that 
formal control is administered, that persons’ 
freedom is restricted and certain obligations 
imposed. Below I will document what I call the 
rise of the therapeutic by referring to a number 
of programmes where people convicted of of-
fences are subject not merely to a period of 
incarceration or supervision but to a therapeu-
tic intervention. I begin by referring to thera-
peutic programmes in prisons and move on to 
consider therapeutic programmes for people 
convicted of offences, where the programmes 
are conducted outside the prison.
Therapeutic discourse in prisons
Grendon Prison established in 1962, as a 
therapeutic establishment, is structured and 
designed following the principles and practices 
of therapeutic community, which fi rst came to 
4 I will later problematise the designation of these 
programmes and practices, as sites of control, demon-
strating how they should rather be designated sites of 
discipline.
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light, academically speaking, with the publica-
tion of a number of groundbreaking papers in 
19465, describing the ways in which psychiat-
ric hospitals were being utilised in their whole-
ness as a therapeutic instrument. Some crucial 
ideas relating to these early communities are 
participation, social interactions, involvement, 
democratic organisational rule and the break-
ing down of barriers between doctor and pa-
tient. An irony about TC’s within carceral in-
stitutions is that they are by defi nition levelling 
instruments, breaking down barriers between 
staff and clients and abandoning traditional hi-
erarchies. Maxwell Jones (1968) stated “The 
TC concept involves a redistribution of power, 
authority and decision making … and a more 
democratic egalitarian social structure gener-
ally”. And Haddon described innovators of TC 
as trying “not to effect more humane control 
but to liberate.” The aim was resocialisation 
into everyday life, that is, change, rehabilita-
tion. In therapeutic communities the activi-
ties involved in the day to day running of the 
institution (be it hospital or prison) and the 
social relations which that unavoidably entails 
are the key to preparing the individual for a 
resocialised return to the outside world. TC’s 
create subjects by involvement, participation, 
activity and talk. This model was to spread to 
other prisons during the 1990’s.
In 1991-2, the former head of the Assess-
ment Unit at Grendon established a therapeutic 
community unit at Gartree Prison in Leicester-
shire for 23 life sentence prisoners. The unit 
“is a multi-disciplinary staffed unit which aims 
to provide a safe environment within a prison 
setting in which prisoners can become reason-
able, rational and responsible people through 
therapy” (association of therapeutic communi-
ties homepage, 2001a)
Praise for the Grendon model came from 
high places. In 1997, the Chief Inspector of 
Prisons stated: “I strongly support the work 
that is being done at Grendon, and the expan-
sion of the therapeutic approach to other es-
tablishments” (Ramsbotham 1997). Similarly, 
Richard Tilt, the Director General of the Prison 
Service is cited by Cullen (1998) as saying that 
Grendon “is a remarkable example of what can 
be achieved with the right approach and cul-
ture. I hope that we can recreate it somewhere 
before long”. And in July 1997, the prison 
service announced that a new prison was to 
be built in Marchington, Staffordshire. This 
was to become the privately owned and run 
Dovegate prison. It currently has an operation-
al capacity of 860 inmates. 200 of these places 
are in a therapeutic community regime set up 
following the Grendon model and opened on 
12th November 2001, 4 months after the main 
prison. This therapeutic regime is listed in 
the association of therapeutic communities’ 
directory as a “residential TC for adult male 
prisoners … with 4 years plus sentences.” 
“Residents” must be over 21 years of age and 
the average stay is 18 months. The potential 
paradox of running a therapeutic community 
within a prison is captured in the answer to a 
question in this directory: “What is it about 
the organisation that makes it a Therapeutic 
Community?” Answer: “The entire TC section 
is run as a democratic TC within the contrac-
tual constraints of a prison” (see association 
of therapeutic communities homepage 2001b; 
H.M. prisons service homepage & Prison Serv-
ice press Release, July 1997).
Another Therapeutic Unit is the Max Glatt 
Unit in Wormwood Scrubs prison, which is 
primarily for sex offenders. Wexler (in Cul-
len, Jones & Woodward 19976) also reports 
surprisingly that “TC’s have recently be-
come the treatment of choice in American 
prisons”(p161). This remarkable claim is re-
lated to an evaluation study of a programme 
5 These were republished in The International Journal 
of Therapeutic Communities and Supportive Organi-
sations 1996 Vol 17 No.2.
6 This text provides a fi ne overview of Therapeutic 
Community provisions for persons convicted of of-
fences.
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on Staten Island, New York. This programme 
was specifi cally designed for offenders with 
substance abuse problems. Wexler states 
also that “the TC model was accepted as the 
most effective type of prison drug treatment 
intervention and was widely utilized in many 
states” (p.162). For example, in Texas in 1991 
a treatment approach “provided prison inmates 
with 12 months of TC treatment followed by 
another 12 months of transitionary services in 
the community” (p163). Wexler describes these 
moves as a “shift in correctional policy empha-
sis from deterrence to rehabilitation” (p163). 
Losel (in Cullen, Jones and Woodward 1997) 
also describes the shift from “nothing works” 
based strategies towards what he describes as 
“correctional treatment”. Losel’s chapter is an 
introduction to the German social-therapeutic 
prisons whose development began in 1966. In 
1994 Losel notes that 831 inmates were incar-
cerated in social therapeutic prisons. In 1997 
there were “15 social therapeutic settings and 
departments” in Germany.
The National Association for the Care and 
Rehabilitation of Offenders (NACRO, 1998) 
reported that the prison service runs Sex Of-
fender Treatment Programmes (SOTP) in 25 
UK prisons. The target for 1998-99 was for 
680 prisoners to complete the programme. In 
response to a parliamentary question in the 
British House of Lords, Lord Williams of 
Mostyn stated that in the fi nancial year 1998-
99 “about 3000 prisoners are expected to com-
plete accredited programmes” (Parliamentary 
Questions 19987). The accredited programmes 
referred to included SOTP and cognitive skills 
offending behaviour programmes (but not 
Grendon and the other TC oriented units).
Therapeutic discourse 
in the community
NACRO (1998), in an article on the world 
wide web state “the number of treatment pro-
grammes for sex offenders run by the probation 
service has greatly increased in recent years.” 
Statistics are cited from a 1995 survey by Chief 
Offi cers Of Probation showing that there were 
109 community programmes for sex offenders 
with a capacity of 1907 places per year. The 
aim of these programmes was “to tackle and 
change (these) distorted attitudes.” The Wol-
vercote Clinic is one example of a specialist 
residential treatment facility for sex offend-
ers in the UK. Funding for residents comes 
partially from the Home Offi ce if a client is 
referred by Probation and totally if referral is 
a condition of post-release supervision recom-
mended by the parole board. Note here how 
treatment must be recognised as a condition 
for release, a requirement, an imposition. In 
an editors note to the reports of parliamentary 
questions on this issue an American article is 
cited which states that “approximately 1500 
programs nationally provide some form of 
treatment for sex offenders”, (Parliamentary 
Questions 1999).
At the Probation Centre where I was em-
ployed persons convicted of offences were as-
sessed for suitability for a community sentence 
and programmes were developed and imple-
mented where sentences would normally have 
been less than 2 years in prison. Assessments 
and recommendations for sentencing were 
submitted to the courts. Staff were mostly 
social workers and the programmes were 
constructed based on the assessed needs of 
referred persons often focussing on issues of 
housing, employment, and offending behav-
iour. The courts could choose to refer a person 
to a very specifi c group programme. 2 such 
programmes, both infused by therapeutic dis-
course were Anger Management and STARC 
Choices. STARC stands for STrategies Aimed 
7 The editor of Parliamentary Questions 1999 raises 
an interesting issue stating “Are SOTP’s effective, 
or a placebo to allay public concern?” This question 
indicates the complex relation between the public and 
those imprisoned which informs policy making.
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at Reducing Crime and was a semi-structured 
group programme built around a cognitive-
behavioural framework.
Anger Management, which I co-facilitated, 
was a programme that involved 12 weekly 
sessions of 2-3 hours. Participants were “sen-
tenced” to attend the group knowing the alter-
native was probably prison. They were all men 
convicted of offences of violence including for 
example, assaults on partners and strangers, 
pub brawls and even road rage. For most it 
was not their fi rst conviction for violence. 
The programme was semi-structured and cer-
tain topics such as drug and alcohol abuse, 
and effects on victims were addressed quite 
didactically but underlying practice was an 
assumption that facilitators were non-experts, 
that the group was participatory, that it was 
participants’ own experiences and accounts 
of their own feelings, thoughts and behav-
iours which were important. We attempted to 
utilise Yalom’s (1985) 12 therapeutic factors 
particularly interpersonal learning, instillation 
of hope, and universality. Offi cial intentions of 
the group were to reduce offending behaviour. 
Facilitators assumed that one way to this goal 
was via critical self-refl ection, by engagement 
with others, by the development of insight and 
by being challenged about one’s actions.
TC’s in the wider penal context
The above account of programmes, in and 
outside prisons, is far from exhaustive and 
serves merely to illustrate some developments 
in practices of dealing with people convicted 
of offences. It would be a mistake however 
to view the inroads therapeutic discourse has 
made in terms of programmes and practices as 
in any sense dominant. Therapeutic prisons are 
a minority. And the incursion of therapeutic 
practice is only one of a series of develop-
ments in penal practice in the last 30 years or 
so. Indeed even more recently one has begun 
to see the co-option of therapeutic discourse by 
a managerial ideology, where treatment pro-
grammes become not about being humane or 
just, but about getting results quickly. Here it is 
not so much the rise of the therapeutic but the 
rise of a specifi c form of the therapeutic – the 
cognitive-behavioural paradigm. Even whilst 
I worked in probation I recognised in myself 
and colleagues what David Garland (2001) 
has called the “anomie” that professionals in 
so-called caring professions feel about the in-
creasingly supervisory and control functions 
they are obliged to carry out in the name of 
effi ciency and results. Indeed, penal policy and 
practice during the last decades has in my view 
been rather disturbing. Western prisons have 
become increasingly full, and law and order 
policies increasingly brutal and inhumane. 
David Garland (2001) in an important contri-
bution to the study of contemporary penal prac-
tice and social change (in USA and UK), has 
listed 12 of the most important trends traceable 
during the last 30 years in this fi eld. Three of 
these are particularly pertinent here, in order to 
contextualise the rise of the therapeutic. They 
are, the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, the 
re-emergence of punitive sanctions and expres-
sive justice, and the reinvention of the prison. 
Regarding the latter Garland states, “the ruling 
assumption now is that “prison works” – not 
as a mechanism of reform or rehabilitation 
but as a means of incapacitation and punish-
ment that satisfi es popular political demands 
for public safety and harsh retribution” (14). 
And further, “In the course of a few decades 
it has gone from being a discredited and de-
clining correctional institution into a massive 
and seemingly indispensable pillar of con-
temporary social order” (14). This then is the 
backdrop against which therapeutic discourse 
has simultaneously been making inroads. It is 
a rather paradoxical situation that points to the 
necessity of a serious consideration of alterna-
tives to incarceration as incapacitation.
In this article I focus on the therapeutic pris-
on, despite and because of its minority status. 
Perhaps there is a chance that such an analysis 
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can contribute to presenting therapeutic prisons 
as a feasible alternative to the current harsh 
ideologies of punishment, retribution and ex-
pressive justice. The overview of programmes 
presented above is illustrative of the (limited) 
penetration of sites of control by the thera-
peutic, or more accurately of an alternative 
way of disciplining. Therapeutic discourse is 
not, in my view, a secret way of controlling 
deviants. Nor is it a straightforward liberative 
discourse. It is much more complex and the 
effects of power / knowledge associated with 
therapeutic discourse are much wider and fur-
ther reaching. In order to illustrate this point I 
examine now the practices of moulding which 
I observed on the Assessment Unit (A Wing) 
of Grendon prison. I begin by introducing the 
structural and relational context in which these 
practices take place. Then I focus on the net-
works of relationships of power, the practices 
of moulding which effect both prisoners and 
prison offi cers and the types of subjectivity 





Certain rules apply to life on A Wing. When 
a new prisoner arrives he is expected to adopt 
these rules. The explicit ones, those laid 
down by the system, are simple enough to 
understand: no violence and no confi dences. 
The premise behind the no-violence rule is to 
try to promote a safe, non-threatening, non-
prison-like atmosphere. The premise behind 
the no-confi dences rule is more deep-seated. 
It concerns the way the Grendon regime is all 
intrusive, all-pervading. Everything you say 
or do, or do not say or do not do, is part of the 
treatment, is analysable, is interpretable. Baron 
(1987) calls this the “ubiquity of interpreta-
tion.” Prisoners are on the whole used to scru-
tiny, to strip searches, cell searches, searches 
of their visitors, but this total surveillance, 
this examination, probing at the very self of 
the inmate, is a new experience and of course 
something they are supposed to embrace.
Small groups9
The small group, meeting 3 times a week, is 
expected to absorb and welcome the hostile, 
fearful individual and gently mould them into 
an image suitable to get along in the thera-
peutic community. (Practices of “moulding” 
will be explored below.) In the small group, 
the inmate is expected to participate at his 
own pace to discuss and be refl ective over 
his current fears, anxieties and expectations. 
Aims are clear and the organisational struc-
ture is explicit, but how individuals are “gently 
moulded” is not so clear.
Community meetings
Community meetings attended by all the 
inmates plus all available staff (who can be 
bothered to attend) are the focal point for com-
munity angst and confl ict (resolution). Here, 
through practices of complaint, accusation, 
revelation, public refl ection and feedback, 
democracy is established, denial challenged, 
responsibility assumed and underlined, and 
individuals made to feel accountable, both in-
mates and staff. This bullpen of testosterone is 
a place to be entered in fear and trembling, a 
place avoided perhaps understandably by staff 
members of a less therapeutically-minded na-
ture. Here, rules are explored and enforced, 
votes taken and selves-in-community consti-
tuted. This is the crucible of organisational 
8 Ashforth and Mael (1989:28) cite Van Maanen (1978) 
as using this terminology with reference to newcomer’s 
identity in an organisational context. In this section I 
consider only a tiny part of the possible practices of 
investiture/divestiture which a newcomer to Grendon 
encounters.
9 See Gender and Players 1995:86-95 for additional 
detail illustrated with case examples, about the types 
of interaction that occur in small groups and wing 
meetings.
40143_Outlines_2003   62 17/01/04, 14:08:13
Outlines • No. 1 • 2003
63
transformation, the fi re out of which the thera-
peutic instrument hopefully re-arises. Twice a 
week, in these meetings, the unit is informally 
reviewed and transformed in the process.
Prison offi cer identity / function
Prison offi cers on arriving at Grendon typically 
have an ambivalent / ambiguous set of expecta-
tions. The techniques of discipline and control 
taught in the prison training school can be seen 
in terms of managing the bodies of prisoners, 
managing time and space, and preparing for 
crises. But at Grendon staff are expected not 
only to lock and unlock doors but also to en-
gage in therapeutic relationships. They are both 
“surveillers”, holders of keys and “therapeutic 
instruments”. They have the responsibilities for 
which they have been trained plus additional 
tasks of involving themselves with prisoners, 
participating in groups and observing and as-
sessing prisoners’ suitability for therapy.
I will consider a little later the product 
– that is, the particular kind of subjects – of 
the interconnections between the context, the 
relational network and the practices of mould-
ing I observed.
Prisoner identity / function
When a prisoner arrives at Grendon it is as-
sumed they wish to change, to examine their 
behaviour, their past, and to engage in a con-
fessional process. They come ideally seeking 
a new identity. Men are seen as responsible 
agents both with respect to their crime and 
with respect to their potential for change. 
Some prisoners – not those at Grendon – see 
Grendon as a soft-option prison for “nonces 
and sickos” (child abusers and the mentally ill). 
Those prisoners motivated for therapy see it as 
the hardest part of their sentence, time spent 
examining themselves and being examined 
both by the system and by fellow prisoners, a 
time of learning to care for the self.
Practices of moulding: 
an analysis
As stated earlier the small group (and A Wing 
as a whole) is expected to absorb and welcome 
the hostile, fearful individual and gently mould 
him into an image suitable to get along in the 
therapeutic community. In this section I ex-
amine some of the practices that contribute to 
the moulding process, namely naming, confes-
sion, surveillance and assessment, tolerance, 
and participation. Moulding is not punishment 
that has a target and a clear result. Moulding 
is more of a subtle art, a sculpting, a re-form-
ing.
Naming
Naming as a practice, as Strauss (1969) has 
noted, marks passage and acts to place or 
classify the individual. A practice peculiar to 
Grendon is the introduction of new members 
whereby everyone in a community meeting 
introduce themselves in the following man-
ner: “I’m Jim doing 10 years for rape”; “I’m 
Al, prison offi cer” Here one is positioned 
with respect to one’s crime and one’s sen-
tence, and for staff one’s difference (revealed 
also in uniform) is acknowledged. The brev-
ity of staff announcements underlines perhaps 
that their “bird” (sentence) is limited to this 8 
hour shift.
Storytelling / Confession
Whilst group meetings on A Wing are not 
primarily for therapy I consider them broadly 
speaking as therapeutic and of absolutely pos-
sessing a storytelling/confessional element. 
Rose and Foucault (Rose 1992) have both 
noted the parallel between the practice of ther-
apy and the religious practice of confession. 
Rose writes specifi cally that confession has 
an identifying and a subjectifying character. 
By telling one’s story within the confi nes of 
therapeutic discourse one’s story is limited by 
that discourse and thus one’s storied identity is 
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also boundaried. Within the narrative perspec-
tive an interesting question is whether multiple 
stories can emerge or whether the prisoner is 
obliged to construct a single linear account 
of his life. It could well be that the practice 
of group therapy allows for the possibility of 
diverse accounts, that is, as one presents to a 
number of people over consecutive meetings 
a number of stories get told, contributing to a 
more nuanced and complex picture of the per-
son. Olthuis (1994) has described a key part 
of the therapeutic process as getting the story 
straight, of ordering one’s story such that it 
makes sense in the present. He has called this 
process re-story-ing, making a play on the verb 
restore, to make new. Story-telling as part of 
the therapeutic process is clearly a key player 
in the moulding of identity. One is moulded 
by one’s own telling and by hearing the sto-
ries of others.
Assessment & surveillance
The practice of assessment is, as mentioned 
with respect to the no-confi dences rule, all-per-
vasive. It is not the psychological test which is 
paradigmatic here10, neither is it the concept of 
“test yourself”. Rather it is a practice of “show 
yourself, reveal yourself” which predominates. 
The responsibility for being assessed positive-
ly, for being found suitable for therapy rests 
with the prisoner. Explicitly it is staff who as-
sess. Yet they assess via observation. It is what 
they are presented with in everyday life on the 
wing that they have to assess. Thus the pres-
entation of self in the best possible light is the 
goal of the prisoner. The prisoner must present 
an image to create an impression. Prison staff 
create an image based on their impressions. 
Presenting an image involves a constant self-
refl ection and self-surveillance.
The practice of surveillance is an integral 
part of assessment. Yet there are no hidden 
cameras and the staff to prisoner ratio is not 
particularly high, whilst prisoners are relatively 
free to associate with whom they choose within 
the confi nes of the unit. Surveillance is again a 
form of self-control. Prisoners are constantly 
self-aware because of the practice of feedback 
whereby anything private or public can be-
come material for discussion in small groups 
or wing meetings. Meetings can be seen as 
formalised, repetitive, ritualised events, similar 
to those focused on by Kilduff et al (1997), 
whereby prisoners have the opportunity to 
publicly display their image but also to reveal 
or disclose the images of others. Thus these 
two “mechanisms of power”11 assessment and 
surveillance ensure that the prisoner in Rose’s 
words is “subjected not by an alien gaze but 
by a self-refl exive hermeneutic” (in Parker and 
Shotter 1990). Here we see “the operation of 
a relational power that sustains itself by its 
own mechanism and which for the spectacle 
of public events, substitutes the uninterrupted 
play of calculated gazes … without recourse 
… to excess, force or violence.” (Foucault 
1977:177) This is a “disciplinary power … 
exercised through its invisibility; at the same 
time it imposes on those whom it subjects a 
principle of compulsory visibility” (Foucault 
1977:187).
Tolerance: 
learning to accept self and other
Prisoners must learn to practice tolerance. To 
be deemed suitable they must show they are 
responsible enough to hear others speak, able 
to give space, to be tolerant. Robbers must be 
able to demonstrate that they can tolerate child 
molesters and even listen to accounts of their 
crimes. Child molesters must dare to talk to 
robbers about their crimes. Dudiak (1998) has 
problematised the process of dialogue showing 
that dialogue is not suffi cient for interparadig-
matic communication. In the prison context 
10 Compare with Rose’s (1992) account of psychological 
tests as paradigmatic of the (contemporary) era of the 
calculable individual.
11 Clegg (1998).
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how is it that sex offenders and robbers learn, 
or are expected to learn, to accept one another 
and grant each other legitimate rights in the 
community? The therapy manager’s rationale 
is to place emphasis on sameness, to instil in 
the robber the idea that both parties are there 
to achieve change, that is they have shared 
goals. In addition they share a current life situ-
ation. The logic goes that it is harder to reject 
someone and easier to accept them the more 
similar they appear to me. But what happens 
to differences? Are they merely swept under 
the carpet? It would seem that by placing an 
emphasis on similarities the prisoner could be 
put at a disadvantage on entering the outside 
world where life is perhaps organised more 
along lines of differentiation than lines of 
similarity.
It could however be that what goes on is 
not so much an ignoring of difference – differ-
ences are after all reinforced regularly by the 
confession/naming ritual – but rather an em-
phasis instead on shared humanity and shared 
position. As Wenger (1998) would perhaps put 
it, engaging in shared activities gives rise to 
communities of practice where shared mean-
ings are created which can potentially be in-
clusive if that is what is required for a given 
community to function.
Difference is not forgotten but perhaps the 
tenuous nature of members’ attachment to the 
community allows simultaneously for identifi -
cation and detachment12. To identify with the 
unit means to tolerate difference. The practice 
of collectively problematising the relation-
ship between sex offenders and robbers (that 
is, the fact that this dynamic is constantly in 
the spotlight in community meetings) is per-
haps a sign of the paradox of identity, that is, 
the simultaneous desires to belong and to be 
distinct. Staff must also learn to tolerate their 
charges. Commonality is also emphasised in 
this regard. Prisoners become persons in the 
eyes of staff through staff exposure to the raw 
existential facts of prisoners’ lives that are re-
vealed in groups. Combined with a need to 
live together, contact with prisoners’ stories 
(their narrative identities) rather than with 
prisoners as number or crime statistic allows 
for a mutual experience of learning or getting 
to know one another.
In this way, through engaging in com-
munities of practice, respective images and 
reputations become weakened and toleration, 
even acceptance, can be practised. Tolerance 
of others allows for tolerance of one’s own 
“shadow” side and thus contributes to the 
moulding process.
Participation
On A Wing, to participate appropriately is to 
be on the road to be(com)ing more responsible. 
Participation can be viewed as transformative. 
One becomes something/someone new some-
one response-able, someone able to respond 
to one’s fellow human beings in appropriate 
ways. If one does not participate, the ultimate 
danger is that one is returned to one’s send-
ing prison with lowered self-esteem and an 
experience of rejection in one’s psychologi-
cal baggage. One becomes something new 
anyway. The intervention, as any interven-
tion, does make some difference. Change 
goes potentially either way. Wenger (1998) 
has described the dual-directional nature of 
communities of practice: they can function 
constitutively as both the “cradle of the self 
and the cage of the soul.”
By participating (or not participating) one 
is created as a subject at the same time as 
one subjects oneself to the “psy practices” in 
which one actively engages. In this way one 
subjugates oneself; one actively allows one-
self to be moulded, to be produced. And at the 
same time one produces a new community. 
As one is constituted, so one also constitutes. 
The types of subjectivity produced, feedback 
to the organisational context. The structural 12 Meyerson and Kolb (1998) explore this possibility. 
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context of the day to day running of the unit 
is by defi nition changed by its very nature of 
being a “holder” or container for the consti-
tution of identities. It does not determine but 
rather creates space for change and is changed 
by the spaces it creates, creating new spaces, 
new possibilities for forms of knowledge and 
networks of power.
Through the moulding of the organisation, 
through the debate, the speaking, and by the 
joint sense-making engaged in here, subjects 
are also further moulded. A circular process 
occurs: As prisoners are defi ning their lived-in 
context, they participate in their own subjec-
tifi cation. By redefi ning the collectivity, they 
redefi ne their own identity. What we can ob-
serve at Grendon is a parallel between talk of 
community identity and talk about issues of in-
dividual identity, that is to say the technologies 
of community development produce change in 
individual identity and vice versa.
Panoptic and synoptic processes
Mathiesen (1995 in Norwegian, 1997 in Eng-
lish), echoing Foucault, helpfully describes the 
shift from public execution to panoptic prisons 
as a shift from the many viewing the few to 
the few viewing the many. During public ex-
ecutions, townsfolk thronged in town squares 
en masse to witness the execution of a single 
person or a few people. In the panoptic model 
of prisons, a small number of staff are respon-
sible for keeping an eye on the whole prison 
population. In the group therapy situation 
however, it is the few viewing the many and 
always also the many viewing the few. There 
is a two way process between staff facilitators 
and inmates whereby discipline crosses nor-
mal boundaries and implicates all participants. 
Whilst formal control looks like it goes from 
the few to the many, actual discipline, seen in 
actual practices goes all ways. I am in agree-
ment with Mathiesen in his analysis of the dual 
roles the panoptic (the few see the many) and 
the synoptic (the many see the few) have in 
contemporary society. Later, I will discuss 
further panoptic and synoptic processes to 
show how it is discipline rather than control 
that is at work.
Above I have described 5 practices of 
moulding and touched on the panoptic and syn-
optic framing of interactions. I now consider 
briefl y the relational network and the products 
of these relations and practices.
The relations between staff and prisoners
It is an implicit fact that the relational dynam-
ics within the therapeutic community are the 
main source of therapeutic energy. The net-
works of relationships are rooted in the identi-
ties, positions and practices discussed above. 
In therapeutic community, both prisoners and 
staff have to reformulate their expectations of 
the institution, its members and their own posi-
tions within and in relation to it. The meeting 
of one self and another is recognised as a way 
of forming new identities.
TC’s as subjugating?
Clare Baron (1987) argues that TC’s are actu-
ally just as coercive and subjugating as more 
overt forms of control. She notes that the ab-
sence of formal rules can make informal rules 
all the more powerful. And she frames this as 
a critique. My question is why this should be 
framed in terms of a critique? She notes also a 
particular type of power – that of the power to 
make the rules within which games of power 
are played out. Whilst it is true that there is, in 
the prison setting, a framework within which 
relations of power/knowledge are located, this 
is not in fact created by prison staff as such. 
They do not make the rules. It is more structur-
al and thus, I would argue, a more anonymous 
power. There are extreme tensions in the role 
played out by prison offi cers and they do have 
multiple functions. This does not necessarily 
make their function more coercive or make 
it inherently subjugating. It is rather a differ-
ent form of power. It is a power which to use 
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Foucault’s terminology is both positive and 
productive. TC regimes are examples of the 
working of different kinds of power producing 
particular kinds of subjects.
The product
What is the product of the interconnections 
between the context, the relational network 
and the practices engaged in described in the 
previous sections? What kind of persons are 
produced?
Prisoners are assumed to be(come) respon-
sible, choosing, self-observing subjects. Prison 
offi cers are assumed to be(come) accepting tol-
erant, empathic, open, psychologically aware 
in addition to being observers and enforcers 
of the rules. Both groups share, to a degree, 
the same community. Different forms of sub-
jectivity are created. Different meanings are 
attributed via the different positions occupied 
and statuses acquired/given. TC’s produce in-
dividual prisoners who can (maybe) function 
appropriately in society. TC’s produce staff 
who can (maybe) adjust positions, cope with 
ambiguity, drop their status and participate 
alongside prisoners in the day to day running 
of the community.
Discussion
The above analysis makes clear that one-way 
models of relations of power/knowledge do 
not accurately represent the way things are in 
this particular type of regime.
Attempts to manage change in prisons 
have altered as certain prison regimes have 
undergone a shift from control to cure to care, 
paralleling a shift from punishment through 
treatment to therapeutic self-help13. At Gren-
don change is managed (if we can call it that) 
in/directly via expectation, by the setting of 
constraints and targets and by the establishment 
of local contexts where members engage in 
situated practice. Foucault (1977:172) wrote: 
“The old, simple schema of confi nement and 
enclosure … began to be replaced by the calcu-
lation of openings, of fi lled and empty spaces, 
passages and transparencies.” Is this what we 
are seeing? Are we looking at an “indefi nite 
discipline” as described in the following cita-
tion?
The ideal point of penality today would be an in-
defi nite discipline: an interrogation without end, an 
investigation that would be extended without limit 
to a meticulous and ever more analytical observa-
tion, a judgement that would be at the same time 
the constitution of a fi le that was never closed, the 
calculated leniency of a penalty that would be in-
terlaced with the ruthless curiosity of an examina-
tion, a procedure that would be at the same time the 
permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inac-
cessible norm and the asymptomatic movement that 
strives to meet an infi nity. (Foucault 1977:227)
This seems accurate as a description of what I 
have analysed and yet I mistrust the negative 
tone. If this discipline actually targets all par-
ties and the institutional apparatus, as I sug-
gest, then it becomes less threatening, and less 
ominous than the above citation and the criti-
cal criminologists have claimed. It becomes 
less and not more ominous, given this picture, 
simply because staff do not have a monopoly 
on power. They are themselves caught up in 
power relations.
The therapeutic prison community is not 
a disciplining of subjects as much as it is a 
creation of space for the working of disci-
pline itself. The management of change is not 
management in the sense of direct normative 
control, but the creation of opportunities, the 
constitution of necessary and suffi cient condi-
tions such that self-discipline can function in 
the modes non-specifi cally prescribed by the 
local, particular community. And self-disci-
13 As noted earlier, there is a danger that I overemphasise 
the rise of the therapeutic. If anything, given the pre-
sent political dispensation, and much public opinion, 
at least in USA and UK, it is necessary to speak of 
a swing back to retributive justice and vengeance, at 
least when we think of penal practice more generally.
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pline includes staff too and the accountability 
of the institution.
The practices of moulding explored above 
are disciplinary practices. I make this claim 
despite McMahon’s caveat: “Questions about 
whether specifi c penal practices should or 
should not be classifi ed as “disciplinary” are 
interesting and diffi cult to answer” (McMahon 
1992:34). Moulding practices are disciplinary 
practices in the sense that “discipline “makes” 
individuals; it is the specifi c technique of a 
power that regards individuals both as objects 
and as instruments of its exercise … a mod-
est, suspicious power, which functions as a 
calculated but permanent economy” (Foucault 
1977:170).
(Against) social control /
(For) discipline (as concepts)
What are the implications of the above analysis 
of Grendon Prison for theories of social con-
trol? What does my analysis of disciplinary 
practices offer to debates in critical criminol-
ogy? The arguments of social control theorists 
e.g. Scull (1984), Cohen & Scull (1983) etc. 
have a lot to be said for them but I am scepti-
cal about the broad theoretical approach they 
rest on, that is on the uni-directional exercise 
and action of control. McMahon (1992:211) 
expresses a degree of puzzlement over the way 
“Foucault’s work has been more and more 
explicitly pertinent in the genesis of gloomy 
critical perspectives, particularly where correc-
tions have been concerned.” I too wonder why 
this is and whether it is a necessary reading 
of Foucault. McMahon implies that Foucault 
is misrepresented when she writes “therefore 
although power – following Foucault – is 
usually depicted as a creative or productive 
force, critical assessments of the exercise of 
power, and of its effects, are overwhelmingly 
negative.” McMahon’s major criticism of 
critical criminologists relates to their lack of 
refl exivity, lack of recognition of the function 
of their discourse in power/knowledge dy-
namics: “… adequate study of penality must 
involve scrutiny of the contours of critical 
analysis” (ibid.1992:209). Analytically, the 
critical literature is problematic for focusing 
too deterministically on structures: “It denies 
the importance of human agency in the making 
of history” (ibid:45). Individual prisoners are 
not merely acted upon. They act back. Critical 
criminologists have claimed that the develop-
ment of alternatives leads to an extension and 
expansion of the prison system itself – that 
is that they are not alternatives but additions: 
“In sum the critical literature on alternatives 
sees them not as simply different, but more 
intense, and more ominous, than earlier forms 
of control” (ibid:38) This is problematic for 
McMahon because “(T)he prospect it yields 
for praxis are pessimistic and conservative.” 
(ibid.39) According to Ericson’s foreword 
McMahon (ibid:xvi & xxvii) criticises criti-
cal criminologists for their “one dimensional 
conception of power”, and for “nihilism and 
an abstentionist political stance.”
It is necessary to ask whether control is al-
ways and only negative? Should we not see 
control also as positive and productive? And, 
rather than condemning outright, attend instead 
to what is being produced by particular ideolo-
gies. Mathiesen (1994:ix) states that “The pris-
on’s function, according to Foucault, is among 
other things to create the criminal such that so-
ciety can control him more easily” (my transla-
tion from the Norwegian). Whilst I agree with 
Foucault’s claim that prisons make criminals, 
and thus defi ne illegality and delinquency and 
also norms in society, I am not so sure that 
this is purposively with the intention of being 
able to “control them more easily.” I am un-
easy about the notion that there is a conscious 
activity on the part of the state that aims “to 
control more easily” a certain group of people 
(the delinquents). Foucault himself has negat-
ed readings of his work that accuse him either 
of neglecting the state or “imagining it capa-
ble of minutely controlling individuals’ every-
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day lives” (1991:85). I question the notion of 
“control” understood as a one-way process, as 
power/knowledge administered and exercised 
by one group over another or by one individual 
in relation to another. For me there is no control 
of this kind. Mathiesen (1997:228, original in 
Norwegian 1995) defi nes control as “a change 
in behaviour or attitude in a wide sense, follow-
ing from the infl uence of others”. From where 
comes the infl uence? This defi nition implies 
an actor/agent but such a fi gure is not account-
ed for. Who controls and who is controlled? 
And I do not agree with Mathiesen that con-
trol and discipline are synonymous (ibid). For 
me, putting it rather aggressively, there is no 
control, only discipline. Discipline is the out-
working of networks and relations of power/
knowledge which are unpredictable and work 
in all directions on all participants (and also 
on non-participants in that one cannot not be 
caught up in a web of power/knowledge.) Dis-
cipline seen in this way includes control but de-
limits and reduces its impact and effects at the 
same time as expanding and widening them.
My earlier analysis at the level of pris-
oners and prison staff refl ects relations of 
power/knowledge in the wider sphere. That is, 
I believe relationships between liberal demo-
cratic societies and systems of justice within 
them can be analysed in similar ways. That is 
not to say the same disciplinary practices are 
going on but that the direction and effects of 
multiple discourses and the resultant web of 
power/knowledge is similarly multi-direction-
al and complex. Power is not exercised over 
criminals without there being a counter-effect. 
Prisoners are not moulded without society 
being remoulded. All sides are in transition 
and all parties are implicated. Social control 
perspectives are not purely oppositional either. 
They participate in the wider discourse; they 
contribute to reform but by their very exist-
ence are also implicated in the status quo, in 
the maintenance and transformation of systems 
and practices of power/knowledge.
Do therapeutic practices of moulding retain 
elements of coercion? Is coercion inevitable in 
penal apparatus? Does coercion reach more 
widely in a therapeutic discourse than in a 
non-therapeutic discourse? The answer to this 
question is yes in the sense that disciplinary 
practices target the soul, yet this transforma-
tion or change itself brings with it other effects, 
non-prescribed, multi-directional effects which 
mitigate the coercive. Coercion, like power/
knowledge, is positive and productive. It is 
not just about making people do things they 
don’t want to do.
Social control is seen as given by/in society. 
It is part and parcel of the relation between 
state and individual. Balvig (1999) writes: 
“The formal social control is taken as given. 
It is not that which we should formulate ques-
tions to or search answers for – or so we think”. 
This last twist in the sentence is Balvig’s way 
of undermining the givenness of social control 
(in Foucault’s (1991:76) phrase, of “breaching 
the self-evident”) and encouraging a radical 
questioning of so-called sites of control. Social 
control theories can tend to overestimate the 
power of institutions at the expense of more 
mundane practices, that is, there is a failure to 
analyse mundane disciplinary practices going 
on in the everyday lives of everyday people. 
My analysis of what actually goes on in a thera-
peutic prison and demonstration of effects in 
all directions makes this point.
What does it matter that therapeutic dis-
course targets the soul, social relations, ways 
of structuring self and other, one’s sociality? 
The Chief Inspector of Prisons (Ramsbotham, 
1997) recognises that the key factor in the 
Grendon approach is that “the community 
itself acts as the agent of change” (paragraph 
13). This recognition is key to my under-
standing. It is not to say that persons are not 
responsible for their own change but that the 
community of which they are a part and in 
which they participate functions as a facilitator. 
When the community is a dynamic, in-transi-
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tion heterogenic unit, when the facilitator of 
change is as multiple and all encompassing as 
the TC regime is, its effects cannot be seen in 
simple terms of social control, expanding or 
otherwise.
The dialectic between 
sites of control and society
The conventional criminological wisdom of 
the 70’s and 80’s, regarding the relation be-
tween prison and society in terms of control, 
according to McMahon (1992:33) went as 
follows: “Analysts of decarceration portray 
the net effect of these trends as involving a 
dispersal of discipline: the prison retains its 
institutional strength and is interwoven with, 
and dependent on a “carceral continuum” that 
powerfully pervades social life in ever more 
subtle, complex and effective ways.” In this 
wisdom the prison is seen as the “hard end 
of the system, with the boundaries between 
it and other control institutions becoming 
increasingly blurred. Community and pri-
vate institutions – such as the family, school, 
neighbourhood and workplace – are seen as 
subject to “penetration” and “absorption” by 
formal modes of social control” (p.33; cf also 
Mathiesen 1997:228). It is perhaps easy to see 
how the critical criminologists read Foucault 
when one examines the next citation from Dis-
cipline and Punish:
There are two images then of discipline. At one 
extreme the discipline-blockade, the enclosed in-
stitution, established on the edges of society, turned 
inwards towards negative functions … At the other 
extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline mecha-
nism; a functional mechanism that must improve 
the exercise of power by making it lighter, more 
rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion 
for a society to come. The movement from one 
project to the other, from a schema of exceptional 
discipline to one of a generalised surveillance, rests 
on a historical transformation: the gradual exten-
sion of the mechanisms of discipline throughout 
the 17th and 18th centuries, their spread through-
out the whole social body, the formation of what 
might be called in general the disciplinary society. 
(Foucault 1977:209)
I hope it is clear that I am much indebted to 
Foucault’s work. However, it seems that I 
am running directly counter to a main thrust 
of Discipline and Punish, that the practices 
emerging in contemporary prisons then ex-
tended into society. I am, at least, suggesting 
a counter move whereby developments in so-
ciety at large – in terms of the psychologisa-
tion of everyday life, the rise of the therapeu-
tic – have extended backwards into criminal 
justice and prison systems. I do not doubt 
Foucault’s proposition that illegality in soci-
ety at large becomes defi ned in terms of those 
locked away and that prison is a particularly 
potent example of disciplinary mechanisms. I 
do doubt whether these mechanisms develop 
purely within the apparatus of the prison it-
self and then extend outwards. I propose a 
more dialectical, multi-directional approach 
which I believe is in keeping with the spirit 
of Foucault’s writings. Foucault himself resists 
the idea of being a prophet, not least a prophet 
of doom. He is more about shaking up self-
evident beliefs, of rocking and disrupting what 
we consider as taken for granted.
Above I have noted signs that the disci-
plinary society is taking revenge, sneaking 
back in to the discipline-blockade regimes 
and diluting and transforming them. I reject 
uni-directional models when it comes down 
to discussion of how and where did the thera-
peutic emerge. I think my above analysis of 
Grendon suggests a psychologisation of sites 
of control rather than a leaking over the wall 
of disciplinary practices developed in the 
prison. But this sneaking back in is not one 
way either. There is an exchange, a meeting 
of discourses and practices both within and 
without the prison walls. Like McMahon I 
see a dialectical process at work. Drawing on 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish McMahon 
(1992:5/6) claims, “For the last few centuries, 
the penal exercise of power and the generation 
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of social-scientifi c knowledge have interacted 
with, and reinforced each other.” Above I have 
described a variety of instances where thera-
peutic discourse has penetrated sites of con-
trol. Why do I use the word penetration? This 
implies therapy has impinged from outside 
of prisons, that it has broken in and is taking 
over. I do not actually believe this and it is 
misleading. McMahon (1992:8) refers to the 
“dialectical constitution and reproduction of 
dominant penal and social orders”. Prisons are 
not separate from social life as a whole. Prison 
practices and other disciplinary practices both 
contribute to the psychologisation of everyday 
life and are an extension of it.
The boundaries between practices of dis-
cipline on people convicted of offences and 
wider society are permeable. The prison wall 
does not mark a boundary for the working of 
discipline. Discipline occurs everywhere; it 
cannot be limited by frontier posts or fences. 
It runs through, round and over all practices, 
policies and programmes.
Conclusion: the therapeutic 
prison as “visionary space”
… to portray Grendon purely as a mechanism of 
repressive state power, shrouded by a restrained 
medical imperialism, is to overlook an important 
humanitarian factor in the equation. The men who 
go to Grendon are typically in a state of distress: 
Grendon seeks to relieve their pain. (Gender and 
Players, 1995:14)
How does therapeutic discourse link to the 
traditional disciplinary/punitive functions of 
prisons? I have claimed it is not an extension 
of control nor a challenge to control but a trans-
formation of forms of power. Many questions 
remain about these “new” forms of power.
At the beginning of this article I stated that 
my purpose was to show how the conserva-
tive and liberal critiques of the therapeutic 
prison are misguided. I am aware that I have 
mostly taken issue with the liberal critique. 
This is primarily because I just do not accept 
the basic premise of the conservative postion 
that “crime is a decision, not a disease” as the 
former British Prime Minister John Major put 
it (quoted by Garland 2001, 198). Not that I 
believe crime to be a disease, but it is not only 
a personal decision. Crime must be understood 
within broader structural arrangements and so-
cial inequalities. Garland’s text is insightful 
as he demonstrates how increasingly harsh 
crime control policies have been developed in 
parallel with increasingly anti-welfare social 
policies. Both sets of policies target the same 
social groups and as Garland (2001:201) puts it 
they “share the same assumptions, harbour the 
same anxieties, deploy the same stereotypes, 
and utilise the same recipes for the identifi -
cation of risk and the allocation of blame”. 
Crime is not so much a personal decision as 
a symptom of a social malaise. The other as-
pect of the conservative ideology I reject and 
the other reason for not wasting time trying 
to refute it, is that represented by the popular 
media, where offenders are seen as evildoers 
and monsters. The citation introducing this 
section indicates, as do my interactions with 
Grendon residents, that these inmates are dis-
tressed men requiring help. Assigning them 
stereotypical, even archetypal identities is no 
way to solve problems of crime. It is merely 
an abdication of responsibility.
My challenge to the liberal (or radical) cri-
tique and the repressive hypothesis is based 
on my analysis that the actual practice of 
the therapeutic prison is complex. There are 
structural forces in play, but the dynamics of 
power and discipline at work, for example in 
small groups and wing meetings, are slippery 
and multidirectional. All involved actors are 
implicated in the disciplinary web. My ar-
gument here draws on Mathiesen’s insights 
about the importance of synoptic processes. 
In analysing the therapeutic prison, we need 
to take into account both the panoptic (social 
control) and the synoptic. The consequences 
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of the synoptic (the many inmates viewing and 
engaging the few staff in a therapy session) are 
poorly understood. But recognition that staff 
are caught in such relations is necessary. Such 
recognition dilutes the power of the repressive 
hypothesis that therapy in prisons is necessar-
ily subjugating and staff involved in therapy 
are merely agents of the state.
It is likely that I am overstating the case 
somewhat. Of course there are substantive 
differences between being a prisoner engag-
ing in a therapeutic process and a member of 
staff. Nevertheless, I believe my analysis does 
challenge the liberal position (which, by the 
way, offers no alternative to the conservative 
hard line).
In my title I set a question mark against 
the idea of therapeutic discipline. I wondered 
whether the kind of discipline at work in re-
gimes such as HM Prison Grendon could be 
therapeutic. I tend towards a hope (at least) that 
therapeutic discipline as analysed above is a 
more liberative punishment. McMahon (1992:
224) writes of how “while abolitionists have 
contributed greatly to critical understanding 
of the social reproduction of power relations 
through criminal justice discourses and practic-
es, they have also sought to identify, appreciate 
and facilitate such visionary spaces and strug-
gles as do exist.” My hope is – and its a fragile 
and tentative one – that sites of therapeutic 
discipline might actually be “visionary spaces” 
and sites of genuine struggle both for prison 
staff and prisoners where change for the better 
both for individuals, organisational/relational 
structures and society might be facilitated. I 
further agree with McMahon (1992:218) that 
there is a need to discover and analyse “where, 
how and when … have penal developments re-
fl ected elements of the “paradox of a liberative 
penality”?” This paper is offered as refl ections 
on and a contribution to this paradox.
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